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Introduction
In the aviation field, test pilots have long performed a valuable function in the evaluation and
improvement of new aircraft. Through their special experience and training, test pilots are able
to provide expert feedback for the development process. Although often glamorized by films
and books, the role of the test pilot is basically that of a member of the engineering team. The
test pilot checks out the plane in the air, explores the performance envelope of the various
aircraft systems, notes "bugs" and other infelicities of the equipment, and makes suggestions
for improvements. Test pilots have unusual piloting skills, but more importantly have training
in systematic check-out and a high sensitivity to performance quirks that others might miss
(Hallion, 1981).
Testing new ATC equipment necessarily involves similar skills to test-piloting. Check-out is
expected to take place according to systematic protocols, and problems in operation are
expected to be spotted and removed. Who is qualified to do this? And what impact will the
involvement of controllers at various stages of the development process have on the
effectiveness of equipment finally released? Patrick Dujardin (1993) has suggested that early
involvement of controllers in the R & D process may discourage important advances, since
controllers will feel comfortable only with equipment that seems familiar. There is broad
agreement, in fact, that early involvement of working controllers is likely to lead to
compromises or kludge designs. The regular controller is unlikely to want to "push the
envelope." Many observers have remarked that equipment used by the FAA, both currently and
in the near future, reflects this conservative attitude.
A test controller, however, would not share the same bias against new equipment. Note that
this is a different role from the evaluation of finished systems. The "test controller" would be
used to seeing equipment in raw form, just as a test pilot would be. Again following the
analogy with airplane development, a test controller would have to be recognized as a top
practitioner, with the respect of other controllers. Such a person's certification of the equipment
to the working controller, then, would be one guarantee that the equipment, if not trouble-free,
would be at least safe and efficient to use.
New hardware and software now face stiff resistance if they originate from someone other
than facility automation specialists. For instance, FAA-produced software for airport ATC
systems has many credibility problems. It is not perfect, and in any case needs to be customized
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to handle site-specific problems. Currently, having capable controllers is the best guarantee
against software's inadequacies. Most controllers use "so-so software developed by someone"
as Jim Schmidt of Martin Marietta puts it. Controllers must carry on from where the software
leaves off, bridging between it and the operating situation. Potentially, certification by a "test
controller" that new equipment satisfies human factors requirements might give controllers the
confidence they need to master complex new equipments and procedures.
Another important feature of the test controller is checking out the "far comers of the
envelope." In the R & D process, early efforts are focused on getting the system to work. But
test controllers need to try to make it fail, to exercise it, as it were, beyond ordinary limits, to
eliminate the hidden bugs. Ideally, of course, a better process would be developed for getting
error-free software. In real life, however, automated systems are likely to possess "glitches"
difficult to eliminate. For instance, a recent Wall Street Journal article reported that the
Honeywell autopilot installed in Boeing 747's behaved in mysterious ways. The FAA noted
about 30 incidents, including a recent near-crash over Thunder Bay, Canada, involving
malfunctioning autopilots. Experts have been unable to isolate the fault (Carley, 1993). Thus,
test controllers need to check the system out using "impolite" actions. This is very similar to
what Sir Karl Popper recommends in his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery: propound
bold hypotheses, and then give them severe tests (Popper, 1961).
Before we go further, however, we need to consider the innovation process itself, since a
test controller will have to fit into it. Innovation in the United States Federal Aviation
Administration is a very problematic process. We need to examine it in a bit more detail before
going further.
Innovation: A Long Haul
Charles Franklin "Boss" Kettering once said that "getting a new idea into a factory is the
greatest durability contest in the world." He might have said this about Air Traffic Control. The
current process by which new ATC equipment is introduced is slow and inefficient in many
ways.
1) There are excessive delays, on the order of a decade or more, from the time new
equipment is developed until it is actually used. Thus, by the time the equipment is
installed, it has usually been obsolete for years. It may nonetheless represent a real
advance over what was used before. Many airports function with equipment that
controllers think properly belongs in museums. This is demoralizing both to innovators
and operators.
2) An incremental approach is used. This approach forces new equipment to be
compatible with current equipment, often leading in the end to an inelegant, "kludge"
design, rather than an optimal re-design from the ground up. While each new piece of
equipment may function well on its own, nothing guarantees either its compatibility or
lack of redundancy with current equipment.
3) Use of political fiat is sometimes used to impose "quick fixes" that need better testing
before implementation takes place. In many cases these programs fail to work as
planned and thus increase barriers to further innovation. Problems include failure to
introduce new equipment effectively, to take learning curve considerations into account,
appropriate check-out by "test controllers," and well-conceived instructional methods.
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4)Veryhighstakesareinvolvedinsecuringgovernmentcontracts,leadingtointense
strugglesonthepartofprivatefirmstogetheirproductaccepted.Because competing
parties often resort to legal action to block or reverse decisions already made, delay is
common. As with defense contracting, the long haul involved and the "winner-take-all"
outcomes often result in selection of contractors who are good at lasting through the
many rounds necessary to win a contract; these are not necessarily the contractors with
the best systems.
The current system is designed to include three parties: private firms that do the actual
hardware development; FAA higher officials, who make decisions about which devices to
install; and controllers, who will actually use the devices, once they are officially accepted. In
principle, controllers develop needs, these needs get expressed as FAA requirements, and
private industry responds to the requirements by hardware or software innovation. But there is
a built-in paradox. The paradox is that controllers do not know what they can ask for until they
know what can be developed. Vendors, on the other hand, often do not understand what
controllers need. FAA higher authority, trying to bridge the gap between needs and products, is
hemmed in on one side by political and legal constraints and on the others by vendors jockeying
for contracts and FAA facilities fearful of clumsy automation.
Something of the complexity of bringing a new system on line is revealed by the failure of
the IBM® Advanced Automation System to be implemented on schedule (Burgess 1993). The
Advanced Automation System (AAS) will cost something over $4 billion to develop in a joint
effort between IBM and the FAA. It will replace the current generation of mainframe-generated
pictures for controller positions with personal computers, and will offer much more flexibility.
But the FAA continually revised the specifications, and IBM seems to have created its own
delays. The system will require something like 1.6 million lines of code, about the same order
as "Star Wars." The specification documents themselves would form a stack about three and a
half feet high. In basic terms, the contract involves the normal delays and overruns of the
typical big-ticket military weapons system project. This is not a good sign.
Since the system has long delays, attempts to get around the normal channels are common.
As Lee Paul (1979) has written, "The number of years required by an orderly development
process results in irresistible pressures to bypass the system." This often leads to ill-considered
moves, including "designs by fiat" that not only fail but also prejudice future attempts at
innovation. The formal system also largely ignores the automation specialists (see below) and
other members of the system who often have excellent ideas, but who are not considered
partners in the innovation process. On the other hand, there has been long-term involvement of
controllers on work teams.
These complex dynamics do not bode well for getting the right control equipment to the right
people in the right time frame. A top priority for the FAA might well be to examine its own
innovation process,
Patching It Up
Ironically, the controllers often seem to do better themselves through informal networking
when it comes to customizing ATC software. While some software can be originated locally,
hardware on the other hand necessarily is produced off-site and centrally tested and introduced.
Still, because each site has slightly different requirements, software can be generic only up to a
certain point. Beyond this point, software must be customized for the specific site. This is done
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through"patches":oftwareorientedtosite-specificproblems,andwrittenbylocal"automation
specialists."Forinstance,atDetroitMetropolitanAirport(DTM)theFAA-produced A-305
ARTS-III software (introduced in 1993) was voluminous. Documentation for the software was
four large volumes, each a folio volume the size of a desk encyclopedia. The cross-reference
book alone weighed 20 pounds. Yet the software required 190 patches to adapt it to local
conditions. The automation specialists on the staff estimated that development of this
supplemental software required several months to complete, exclusive of already existing site-
specific software, which also had to be changed. In principle, software received from the FAA
is supposed to be implemented "as is." The reality is that this cannot be.
At Chicago O'Hare Airport, for instance, there was at one time a rule that strictly limited the
number of local patches. This rule, however, did not make sense, and so was constantly
bypassed. Each time local controllers asked for a specific change, the patch would be added to
an existing patch, which clearly flouted the spirit of the rules, though superficially legal. This
bypassing of the system was never formally acknowledged. Nonetheless, the local
programmers thought FAA officials must have been aware of it.
While sites are often different, many sites share the same problems. The obvious thing,
then, is to make sure that a site has available to it any patch in the system that will solve its
problems. Although all patches used anywhere are included on a list sent to all "automation
specialists," this list is seldom seen by controllers, and is hard to interpret in any case.
There are about 200 automation specialists in the United States. They are former controllers
now responsible for software management at the control centers. They are expected to act as the
local interface between the needs of controllers on one hand and the provision of new
automation through borrowing patches or getting local technicians to do the programming.
However, they usually have their hands full with programming responsive to demands by the
local controllers for various kinds of minor fixes. One major airport had a list of 30 such
patches waiting to be programmed; this is fairly typical. These demands are often either made
by top management or presented through union channels, which makes them hard to ignore.
Useful patches, then, may often get lost in the system's complexities because they are not
available in a user-friendly way.
The automation specialists have more credibility because they are former controllers.
Knowing the job that the controller must do in some detail makes their products far more user-
friendly than it might otherwise be. But few have college degrees in computer science. Some do
not have college degrees at all. They get considerable in-service training from the FAA, but
both they and others believe that their programming would be superior if they had more
computer training.
No one knows how much of the innovation in the system is actually due to the local
automation specialists. For instance, a program called Cenrap allows the local facilities to get
radar screen pictures even if their antenna goes out, by getting information on plane positions
from more powerful Regional Center (ARTCC) radars. This program was reportedly suggested
in about 1985 by either an automation specialist or a technician who realized that capabilities
already in use, with a little extra work, could provide back-up radar pictures for facilities that
lost their radar but not their system (ARTS-III) software.
Local Content
To compensate for the system's inadequacies, informal networking often provides the primary
channel for patches to travel from one center to another. In the FAA southern region, for
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instance, an informal computer bulletin board provides information about patches. Other
information comes about through individuals who move from one site to another, or who
through union duties or curiosity circulate through the system. Actually watching a patch in
operation may be more valuable than reading an abstract about it.
Yet informal networking clearly is a second-best to a user-friendly system for spreading
information about patches. Why is there not a dedicated "patch specialist" who knows what is
available who travels through the various sites?
Similarly, site development of patches is often done partly sub rosa. Legally, patches must
be run through Washington D.C. for regulatory approval before they are used. The formal
approval process takes about a year. After approval, the patch is sent back to the site for on-line
testing. But local automation specialists do not want to send a patch through the system until
they know it works. And how do they know it works? They try it out. To try it out, they need a
computer. Often the only computer available for the purpose is the Center's main computer. It
would be best to try the patch out on a mock-up computer off-line, but mock-up computers can
cost as much as the main computer. So the patch is run on the main computer at a lull time,
such as 2 AM. Controllers will almost never try to control aircraft with experimental software.
Locking up the system would be both dangerous and would jeopardize their jobs. But without a
realistic (i.e., live) test, they do not want to release the software. So while planes are controlled
through some other method, the patch is tried out. Once it is known to work, it is sent through
the formal process.
[I was unable to gain any information regarding site-generated patches for the regional (en
route) centers. Ostensibly, all patches for regional centers must originate from the FAA
Technical Center in Atlantic City. To proceed otherwise risks severe legal sanctions.]
Higher echelons of the FAA must know that this kind of covert experimental activity goes
on, although they cannot publicly either acknowledge or condone it. However, while obviously
better than a paper check-out of the software, this "skunk works" approach has some dangers.
One of the problems is that fewer programs result from it than would if it were openly
acknowledged. Controllers and automation specialists would both get in serious trouble if they
were caught operating with an illegal patch. It would be better if the test were carried out
openly. But the best would be creation of what Lee Paul calls a "more forgiving environment,"
where experiments with patches could be run off-line, a full-scale simulation facility that could
be customized temporarily to run a Center's software.
Controllers' experience with innovation has largely been negative. Good ideas by those
lower down in the system often seem to get stone-walled or put on the back burner. Ideas that
come down from the top are often half-baked or flawed. But the strongest message about
innovation is the equipment with which controllers in the U.S.A. are forced to use. State-of-
the-art aircraft are controlled by ATC equipment which is often two or three generations out of
date. Whether the explanation for this state of affairs is politics, bureaucracy, or sheer
conservatism, the message it sends is one of stagnation and indifference. "Good enough for
government work" seems to be the limit the controller can expect. Controllers have to be good;
their equipment is not.
Test Controllers
The innovation process for new hardware and software occurs along a timeline that can largely
be considered in three phases: research and development, preliminary testing, and full-scale
deployment. There is a role for controllers in testing new hardware and software in each of
these phases.
226 Westrum
Research and Development. A role in R & D means that the controller would act in the same
role as a test pilot. He or she would encounter new equipment in its formative stages and would
be able to help suggest improvements which would move the system from the prototype to the
operational stage. The FAA currently is using controllers on its work teams for the new
consoles that IBM is developing in Rockville. Some of these controllers have been on the teams
for ten years. However, unlike the system for test pilots, there is no way that the experience of
these controllers as test controllers is recorded other than in the design of the equipment. They
are simply sent back to their centers after they finish their tasks. Note also that at many ATC
facilities, local software will be tested by individuals who serve the role of test controller for
that facility, even though the term as such may not be used. Donald Pate at the Standards
Development Branch of the FAA in Oklahoma City similarly uses journeymen controllers for
his experimentation and standard-setting.
One anonymous observer pointed to a problem with the use of ordinary controllers in the R
& D process. Early involvement of routine users tends to lower the team's sights, and thus may
lead to incremental changes rather than re-design from the ground up. An example is the FAA's
use of a "Sector Sweep Validation Team" involving ordinary controllers early on in the process.
Ultimately, the console produced by the team was a kludge design, according to this individual.
Thus early involvement can lead to dangerous compromises. A "test controller," in principle at
least, would have enough experience with the innovation process to be less bothered by radical
innovation.
A second problem to which union representative Larry Barbour called attention is the
attrition of skill among controllers who are promoted to supervisor. Several individuals noted
that supervisors could no longer be considered proficient in acting as controllers, once
promoted. During the PATCO strike, many of the supervisors actually had to do some
controlling. This was a frightening experience for some of them who had lost their skills. "I
remember watching some of these guys with sweat pouring down their backs," said one
observer. Yet several of the IBM-design work teams contained a majority of supervisors by the
time the project was finished. One work team had one controller and eleven supervisors!
This, however, would be a problem for test controllers, too. Some method for alternating actual
control experience and innovation activities would be necessary.
Preliminary Testing. In this phase, the overall design of the software or equipment is fixed, and
the purpose of testing is to eliminate any remaining "bugs". The role of controllers here is to act
as intelligent customers rather than test pilots per se. It is often during this phase also that
software can be customized for a particular site. Hugh Bergeron and Harold Heinrichs report
their experiences in using controller "cadres" ftrst to test software, and second to act as trainers,
both at Denver and at Dallas/Fort Worth. These experiments seem to have been very successful,
though the system was not completely ready for them (Bergeron and Heinrichs, 1993).
Bergeron and Heinrich's cadres might be seen as somewhat analogous to the New
Equipment Introduction Details (N.E.I.D.) used by the U.S. Signal Corps in World War II.
The Signal Corps, finding that newly developed equipment typically was not accepted in the
field, developed a kind of special detachment under the leadership of a Lt. Col. Jensen. The
detachment included no one withou_ a uniform, and no one ranking above a major or below a
sergeant. It always accompmued the equipment from the point of origin (the factory) to the field
with no hand-offs. The Signal Corps discovered that this scheme was so successful that it
could not get equipment into the field without an N.E.I.D. Unfortunately, the value of this
device was not recognized after the war, and so no one studied it. Its only mention in the
official history of the Signal Corps in World War II is a tiny footnote.
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Full Scale Deployment. During this phase, controllers are still important as intelligent users.
Cadres who have been used in phase 2 to work out bugs can act as brokers between laboratory
and ATC facilities to transmit information backwards and forwards between designers and
users. As equipment and software is given a full-scale test, limitations and bugs will become
apparent. Often this may mean moving the novel hard- or software to a new location, with new
demands. IBM, using Seattle Regional Center (ARTCC) as a test site, is rumored to have
eliminated phone jacks from the controllers' positions which a "D man," used extensively in the
busier centers to work computers and assemble flight strips, could use. Protests by Cleveland
Center (and others) quickly got the jacks back. Developing effective channels for user feedback
is thus very important.
Discussion And Conclusion
Earl Wiener points out that human factors problems fixed during the R & D stage are paid for
once. When they are not fixed during R & D, they are then paid for every day. How users are
involved in the R & D process to assist in developing equipment is a critical issue. Effective
involvement can produce real improvements. Ineffective involvement can produce inefficient
kludges or systems that are actually dangerous.
The underlying problem is the management of information and ideas. To develop a really
generative system (see Westrum 1993) a great deal would have to change in the way that the
FAA innovates. Use of test controllers would solve only some of the problems. For instance,
we have cockpit resource management now for pilots; we may have it soon for controllers. But
the management of ideas in the innovation process also needs intellectual resource management.
Simply involving users is not enough. Brought in at the wrong point in the development
process, users can block or compromise innovation. User involvement must be carefully
considered. A test controller may be one solution to this problem. It might be necessary to have
several kinds of test controllers (en route versus TRACON, for instance). No doubt further
problems would surface in getting test controllers into operation.
I would recommend that the FAA engage in a series of case studies of controller
involvement in the innovation process. A systematic comparison of effective and ineffective
cases would do much to clarify what we ought to do in the future. Unfortunately, I have been
unable to find any cases where test controllers have been used. Perhaps we need to create
some, to see how they work!
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